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Many practitioners hold the view that Proposition 8 led to
dramatic changes in the California criminal justice system. Indeed,
while some of the changes could be labeled "dramatic," even
more dramatic is the resistance of our criminal justice system to
change, as evidenced by its reaction, or lack thereof, to Proposition
8. California voters' efforts to reform our criminal justice system
have been frustrated. Proposition 8's mandate, in the hands of the
criminal justice establishment, has been delayed, ignored, and even
changed.' This Article examines the criminal justice system's
response to the enactment of Proposition 8 and its implementation
of the proposition's major provisions. Part I discusses the right to
* Deputy District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles; B.A., University of California,
Los Angeles (1982); J.D., Loyola of Los Angeles School of Law (1985); member California State
Bar.
1. Proposition 8 was proposed by Paul Gann in 1982 and was intended to make major
changes to the California Constitution regarding criminal justice. CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL
JusTicE, STATE TASK FORCE ON VICTIM's RiGHTS vii (1988). Proposition 8 added section 28 to
article I of the state constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. , § 28. The proposition's preamble provides,
in part:
(a) The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system, encompassing not only the
right to restitution from wrongdoers for financial losses suffered as a result of criminal
acts, but also the more basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts causing
injury to innocent victims will be appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts,
and sufficiently punished so that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal
of highest importance....
Id § 28(a). The initiative also added various sections to the California Penal and Welfare and
Institutions Codes. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West 1988); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1767, 1732.5, 6331 (West 1982).
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victim restitution.2 Part II evaluates the abandonment of the
diminished capacity defense,3 and Part III analyzes the use of prior
felony convictions for impeachment.4 Part IV discusses the Right
to Truth-in-Evidence, including federalization of the exclusionary
rule and repeal of the evidence code.5 This Article concludes that
the criminal justice system has delayed, and possibly failed in, the
implementation of Proposition 8.6
I. THE RIGHT TO VICTIM RESTnuTON
One of the key rights which California voters intended to
bestow upon crime victims was "the right to restitution from the
wrongdoers for financial losses suffered as a result of criminal
acts." 7 However, the voters also specified that sufficient
punishment of wrongdoers was an even "more basic" right of
crime victims than restitution.8 Regarding restitution, Proposition
8 states that "all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal
activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons
convicted of the crimes."',The proposition further provides:
Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every case,
regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime
victim suffers loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to
the contrary. The Legislature shall adopt provisions to implement this
section during the calendar year following adoption of this section.10
Unfortunately, California voters entrusted the legislature to
implement their intent. The statutory framework which the
legislature enacted to implement victim restitution has been
2. See infra notes 7-18 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 44-70 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 71-125 and accompanying text.
6. See infa notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
7. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(a).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 28(b).
10. ILL
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infuriating for both California prosecutors and crime victims. The
voters intended that all crime victims suffering financial losses
would receive restitution from the persons convicted to compensate
such losses in 'every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition
imposed." 11  However, until 1986, the statutory framework
provided for victim restitution only when the defendant was given
a probationary sentence.' 2 In other words, if the defendant was
sentenced to state prison, the defendant could not be ordered to pay
restitution to the victim. This prompted one court to state:
[W]e question whether the Legislature fully implemented the
constitutional mandate [of Proposition 8] where the defendant is
imprisoned, there are substantial property losses suffered by victims of
crimes for which the defendant is convicted, and the victims' only
avenue of relief for restitution is by civil remedy. The electorate gave
a clear directive requiring restitution to be ordered in every case
involving a victim absent extraordinary reasons. We doubt it anticipated
the current statutes,, which in some cases still leave the victims to
individually bear the costs and endure the rigors of seeking civil
judgments.13
In 1986, the statutory scheme was amended so that if the
defendant was sentenced to state prison, the court could order
restitution to the victim, but only up to $10,000.14 This statutory
11. IeL (emphasis added).
12. 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 166, sec. 3, at 968-69 (amending former CAL. GOVT CODE § 13967
(West Supp. 1981)); 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 980, sec. 4, at 3391 (amending CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1203.1
(West Supp. 1984)).
13. People v. Downing, 174 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672, 220 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1985).
14. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1438, sec. 1, at 5141 (amending CAL. GOVT CODE § 13967 (West
Supp. 1986)). The former version of section 13967 provided:
In cases in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's
criminal conduct, and the defendant is denied probation, in lieu of imposing all or a
portion of the restitution fine, the court shall order restitution to be paid to the victim.
Notwithstanding subdivision (a), [which provides for a restitution fire of up to $10,000,]
restitution shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, but not' to exceed ten thousand
dollars ($10,000)....
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 166, sec. 3, at 968-69 (amending former CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13967 (West Supp.
1981)). Under this provision the victim could not receive more than $10,000 restitution in cases
where the defendant was not given a probationary sentence. See People v. Rowland, 206 Cal. App.
3d 119, 125, 253 Cal. Rptr. 190, 193 (1988) (holding that, notwithstanding Proposition 8's mandate
requiring restitution to all persons who suffer losses, a trial court is not statutorily authorized to order
949
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framework produced an extraordinary result. In cases where crime
victims suffered losses exceeding $10,000, an extremely common
occurrence in felony white collar crime cases, the victim would
exert pressure on the prosecution and court to give the defendant
a probationary sentence in order to gain full restitution. 5
Paradoxically, the greater the victim's loss, the greater the victim's
desire to seek a probationary sentence for the criminal wrongdoer
rather than a state prison sentence! The prosecutor was thus placed
in the awkward position of upsetting the crime victim if the
prosecutor took the position that those most deserving of state
prison should be sent to state prison. In many white collar crime
cases, the prosecution became a collection agent instead of an agent
of the criminal justice system, seeking sufficient punishment of
those most deserving of it. Contrary to the voters' explicit intent,
the right to sufficient punishment for criminal wrongdoers often
played a subordinate role to the right to restitution. 6
Ht took the California Legislature until 1989 to see the folly of
this extraordinary situation, and amend the statutory framework to
eliminate the $10,000 limitation on restitution in cases where the
defendant is sent to state prison.17 Now, even in cases in which
the defendant is sent to state prison, restitution can be ordered "in
the amount of the losses, as determined," and such an order is
direct restitution to victims where it has sentenced defendant to state prison unless the defendant
expressly agrees to such restitution).
15. For example, except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be served
by granting a person probation, probation is not supposed to be granted to any person convicted of
a theft offense involving a loss exceeding one hundred thousand dollars. CAL. PENAL CODE §
1203.045(a) (West 1992). However, in my experience as a prosecutor, victims suffering over one
hundred thousand dollars in losses are almost always more interested in restitution than retribution.
In one case I prosecuted involving an approximate two hundred and fifty thousand dollar loss, the
victim agreed with the defense attorney to appear before the court and request leniency in return for
approximately one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in restitution. Ironically, the victim has a
constitutional right to make such an appearance under a different section of the same Victims' Bill
of Rights which mandates restitution. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (enacted
by Proposition 8) (providing that crime victim or next of kin has right to attend sentencing and
express his or her views concerning crime)). Consequently, even in cases exceeding the one hundred
thousand dollar loss, defendants ordinarily receive probation.
16. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the "more basic" right of sufficient
punishment).
17. 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 712, sec. 1, at 2111-12 (amending CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13967(c) (West
Supp. 1989)).
950
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enforceable as a civil judgment.'" Although this amendment is a
step in the right direction, it is too early to tell whether elimination
of the limitation on restitution will be effective in remedying the
problems which frustrated the clear intent of the voters behind
victim restitution.
II. ABOLITION OF THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE
Among the changes Proposition 8 sought to make was the
abolition of the "diminished capacity" defense, 19 a defense which
had previously, at least in theory, been legislatively abolished in
California.2" California voters wanted to increase the difficulty of
proving mental defenses.2" Again, their intent was not carried out.
The former diminished capacity defense was available to
defendants in homicide or attempted homicide prosecutions for the
purpose of reducing a charge from murder to voluntary
manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter.22 The charge
of murder requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant
harbored "malice aforethought," namely, an intent to kill or a
conscious disregard for human life.' Voluntary manslaughter, on
the other hand, is an intentional killing without "malice.
' 24
"Malice" can be negated, and a charge of murder reduced to
18. Id
19. CAL PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1988) (enacted by Proposition 8 (approved June 8, 1982)).
Proposition 8 added section 25(a) to the California Penal Code, which provides:
The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action, as well as
any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's intoxication,
trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show or negate
capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought, knowledge,
or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West 1988).
20. See 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 404, sec. 4, at 1592 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (West
Supp. 1981)). Section 28(b) of the California Penal Code provides: "'As a matter of public policy
there shall be no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in
a criminal action or juvenile adjudication hearing." CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (West 1988).
21. Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, PRIMARY
ELETON 54 (June 8, 1982).
22. People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 123-25, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663, 665-67 (1984).
23. California Jury Instructions, Criminal, CALIIC No. 8.11 (5th ed. 1988).
24. Id at CALJIC No. 8.40 (5th ed. 1988).
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voluntary manslaughter, in two ways, as follows: 1) If the
defendant killed in the heat of passion,' or 2) if the defendant
killed with the honest but unreasonable belief he was defending
himself.26 Prior to the enactment of Proposition 8, the law
provided for a third way of negating "malice": diminished
capacity -- a judicially recognized form of voluntary manslaughter
under which elements of "malice" could be rebutted by a showing
of diminished mental capacity, falling short of a complete insanity
defense, due to mental illness, intoxication, trauma, disease, or
defect.27 Proposition 8 sought to abolish this third judicially
created theory for negating "malice" -- the diminished capacity
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a) (West 1988).
26. People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 672, 603 P.2d 1, 2, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 85 (1979).
27. See People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 126-28, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663, 667-69 (1984)
(explaining pre-Proposition 8 law of diminished capacity and concluding that the defense is no longer
available to negate "'malice" and thereby reduce murder to manslaughter). The prior jury instruction
for diminished capacity read as follows:
If you find from the evidence that at the time the alleged crime was committed, the
defendant had substantially reduced mental capacity, whether caused by mental illness,
mental defect, intoxication, or any other cause, you must consider what effect, if any, this
diminished capacity had on the defendant's ability to form any of the specific mental
states that are essential elements of murder and voluntary manslaughter.... Thus, if you
find that the defendant's mental capacity was diminished to the extent that you have a
reasonable doubt whether he did, maturely and meaningfully, premeditate, deliberate, and
reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act, or form an intent to kill, you cannot find
him guilty of a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of the first degree.... Also,
if you find that the defendant's mental capacity was diminished to the extent that you
have a reasonable doubt whether he was able to form the mental states constituting either
express or implied malice aforethought, you cannot find him guilty of murder of either
the first or second degree.
(If you have a reasonable doubt 1) whether he was able to form an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being, or 2) whether he was aware of the duty imposed on him
not to commit acts which involve the risk of grave injury or death, or 3) whether he did
act despite that awareness, you cannot find that he harbored express malice.)
(Further, if you have a reasonable doubt 1) whether his acts were done for a base,
anti-social purpose, or 2) whether he was aware of the duty imposed on him not to
commit acts which involve the risk of grave injury or death, or 3) whether he did act
despite that awareness you cannot find that he harbored implied malice.)
(Furthermore, if you find that as a result of mental illness, mental defect, or
intoxication, his mental capacity was diminished to the extent that he neither harbored
malice aforethought nor had an intent to kill at the time the alleged crime was committed,
you cannot find him guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter.)
California Jury Instructions, Criminal, CALUIC No. 8.77 (4th ed. 1979). This CALJIC instruction is
not contained in the current edition of CALUIC. See generally California Jury Instructions, Criminal
(5th ed. 1988).
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defense.28 The provision of Proposition 8 which purported to
abolish the diminished capacity defense is another example of a
provision which has brought about no change in the day-to-day
practice of criminal law in our state. In practice, Proposition 8 has
not effected change in the way murder cases have been prosecuted
and defended.
Rather than accept the abolition of the diminished capacity
defense, the criminal defense bar has simply presented the same
defense under a new label. Practitioners commonly refer to this
new defense as the "diminished actuality" defense. 9 Under this
defense, defendants have introduced evidence of their mental
capacity, intoxication, trauma, disease, or defect, arguing that such
evidence negates "malice" requiring a reduction from murder to
voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, the evidence and arguments
in murder cases after Proposition 8 have remained unchanged. The
only difference is that the "diminished actuality" defense, unlike
the old "diminished capacity" defense, has no express judicial or
statutory recognition and, therefore, is not contained in the pattern
jury instructions.3" Thus, during trials, the defense has not been
able to point to any jury instructions to support its argument that
evidence of "diminished actuality" requires a reduction from
murder to voluntary manslaughter. If criminal practitioners are
correct in their common perception that jury instructions have little
impact on the outcome of cases, then the absence of the
"diminished actuality" defense in jury instructions, as a means to
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West 1988) (enacted by Proposition 8). See supra note 19
(quoting California Penal Code § 25(a) (West 1988)).
29. The phrase "diminished actuality" is derived from section 28(a) of the California Penal
Code, which provides:
Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder shall not be admitted to
show or negate the capacity to form any mental state, including, but not limited to,
purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with
which the accused committed the act. Evidence of mental disease mental defect, or mental
disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed
a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought,
when a specific intent crime is charged.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing prior "diminished capacity" jury
instructions).
953
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reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, may have little impact
on case outcomes. Although not legally sound, the "diminished
actuality" argument represents essentially an appeal to the jury to
"go easy" on a defendant when extenuating circumstances are
proven.
What is even more remarkable than the defense bar's attempts
to slip in the same evidence and arguments under a new label, is
that courts have sanctioned this approach.31 For example, in the
infamous case of People v. Massip,32 the defendant placed her
baby under the tire of her car and ran over him.33 The defendant
entered dual pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity, but was convicted by jury of second degree murder, and
found sane.34 Thereafter, the trial judge, applying the so-called
"diminished actuality" rationale but without calling it such,
reduced the charge to voluntary manslaughter since the defendant
was suffering from postpartum depression." On appeal, the
prosecution argued that Proposition 8 abolished the "diminished
capacity" defense as a means of negating "malice," and thereby
reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter.36  Thus, the
prosecution contended that the trial judge erred in reducing the
verdict based on defendant's mental condition.37 Remarkably, the
appellate court found that even after Proposition 8, a defendant can
negate "malice," thus reducing a charge from murder to voluntary
manslaughter, by presenting evidence of mental disease or defect.3"
31. See, e.g., People v. Molina, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1168, 1173-76,249 Cal. Rptr. 273,275-77
(1988). Butsee People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119,202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984) (concluding that
the defense of diminished capacity was abolished by Proposition 8); People v. McAlroy, 230 Cal.
App. 3d 782, 785-89, 271 Cal. Rptr. 335, 335-38 (1990), review granted, 798 P.2d 1213, 274 Cal.
Rptr. 370 (1990), review dismissed, 1992 WL 39335 (1992) (holding that jury instruction proffered
by defense in an attempted murder prosecution was properly denied where jury was instructed that
it could not find defendant acted with express malice if due to his alleged reduced mental
functioning).
32. 229 Cal. App. 3d 1400, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1884, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1990), review
granted, 798 P.2d 1212, 274 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1990).
33. Massip, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1889, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
34. Id
35. IL at 1889-90, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
36. Id. at 1895, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1895-1900, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 873-76.
954
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The holding of the court of appeal in Massip bears careful
attention. Rarely has a written opinion been more convoluted. The
court held:
Although voluntary manslaughter has traditionally been thought to
include the intent to kill, no such requirement appears in the statute,
rather, the term "voluntary" implies the intentional commission of a
person endangering act .... The [trial] court could reasonably have
determined malice was absent, and concluded Massip committed a
voluntary manslaughter, if it found an unlawful homicide without a
person endangering state of mind had taken place.39
The "reasoning" the appellate court employed is pure gibberish.
First, the court said that voluntary manslaughter requires proof of
a "person endangering state of mind.", 40  Then, the court
contradicted itself by stating that the defendant could have been
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter if she did not have a person
endangering state of mind.41 Fortunately, as of the date of this
writing, Massip is pending review by the Supreme Court of
California.42 Just before the close of 1991, the supreme court
finally signed the death warrant for the legally untenable
"diminished actuality" defense, ruling that evidence of diminished
mental capacity is not a basis for reducing murder to voluntary
manslaughter.43
39. Id at 1897, 1899, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
40. Id at 1897, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
41. Id at 1899, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
42. People v. Massip, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1884,271 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1990), review granted, 798
P.2d 1213, 274 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1990).
43. People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1991). In Saille,
evidence was introduced to show that defendant was drunk when he murdered a bar security guard.
Id at 1105, 820 P.2d at 590, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. The supreme court ruled that the trial court was
not required to instruct the jury that evidence of voluntary intoxication could negate express malice
and reduce what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter. Id at 1113, 820 P.2d at 598,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
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III. USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR IMPEACHMENT
Proposition 8 amended section 28(f) of article I of the
California Constitution to provide that "[a]ny prior felony
conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult
or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for
purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any
criminal proceeding. '"" The electorate intended to "require" the
admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment "without
limitation," since under pre-Proposition 8 law such information
could be used only under limited circumstances.4
Under ordinary principles of statutory construction, section
28(f) can be interpreted to mandate the use of felony convictions
to impeach a witness' credibility.46 Thus, immediately after the
passage of Proposition 8, commentators,47 legislators,48 courts,49
and practitioners"0 widely assumed that an attorney could attack
a witness' credibility by cross-examining him about any prior
felony conviction without limitation. Thus, initially all elements of
the criminal justice establishment promptly implemented the clear
voter intent regarding adult conviction felony impeachment. Then
44. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(0.
45. See Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLLT, supra
note 21, at 54.
46. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior Misconduct Impeachment Evidence in
California Criminal Cases, 24 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 621, 627 n.46 (1991); Jenkins and Thomas, People
v. Castro: A Road Back to Beagle and Beyond, 13 W. ST. U.L REV. 27, 34 (1985) (asserting that
the intent of voters was not carried out by Proposition 8); Comment, Impeaching the Accused with
Prior Convictions: Does Proposition 8 Put Beagle in the Doghouse?, 15 PAC. LJ. 302, 310 (1984).
47. See Comment, supra note 46, at 310.
48. According to the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, Proposition 8 mandated "the
use of prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes even though the probative value is
outweighed by the danger of substantial prejudice." CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL
JusTIcE, ANALYSIS or PRoposmoN 8: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ImrnAvE 31 (1982).
49. In People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 789 P.2d 887, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1990), the
Supreme Court of California explained that until it addressed the issue, all but one originally
published court of appeal decision addressing the question had concluded that Proposition 8 permitted
the unlimited use of prior felony convictions for impeachment, and that it was "widely assumed that
the 'without limitation' language of section 28(f) eliminated all restrictions on the admissibility of
prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment." 50 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 789 P.2d at 905-06,
268 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
50. See Turner, 50 Cal. 3d at 703-04, 789 P.2d at 905-06, 268 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
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in 1985, despite the language of section 28(f), stating that any prior
felony conviction "whether adult or juvenile" can be used for
impeachment,"' one appellate court held that juvenile convictions
could not be used.52 The controversy over the use of juvenile
convictions for impeachment has not yet been resolved.5"
Also in 1985, the Supreme Court of California, in People v.
Castro,4 ignored the clear voter mandate favoring felony
impeachment by narrowly interpreting Proposition 8. In Castro,
the supreme court placed two important limitations on section
28(f)'s requirement that "any prior felony" shall be admitted
"without limitation. ' 56 First, the court held that California voters
did not really intend to deprive a trial court of discretion to exclude
impeachment with prior felonies if the prejudicial impact of the
impeachment exceeded its probative value. 57  This result
supposedly steered "clear of [federal] constitutional obstacles"
which the court felt would be created if trial courts were deprived
of their discretion to limit prior felony impeachment.5 8 A second
limitation that the court placed on section 28(f) related to that
section's language making "any prior felony" admissible.59 The
court held that a trial court could only allow impeachment of a
prior felony involving "moral turpitude"--a readiness to do evil.60
Again, this result was rationalized under the theory that convictions
not involving moral turpitude are irrelevant to credibility and,
therefore, introducing these convictions would violate the due
51. CAL CONST. art. 1, § 28(f) (emphasis added).
52. People v. Sanchez, 170 Cal. App. 3d 216, 218, 216 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (1985).
53. People v. Pitts, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1547, 1555, 273 Cal. Rptr. 389, 393-94 (1990).
54. 38 Cal. 3d 301, 696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985).
55. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313-16, 696 P.2d at 117-21, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-29.
56. Ia at 313, 696 P.2d at 117-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26. See supra notes 47-54 and
accompanying text (discussing the constitutional provision allowing the use of prior felony adult or
juvenile convictions for impeachment).
57. Castro, S8 Cal. 3d at 313, 696 P.2d at 117, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
58. 1, at 313, 696 P.2d at 117-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-26.
59. 1,
60. Id
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process clause of the United States Constitution,"' which prohibits
introducing irrelevant evidence.'2
However, there is no support for the contention that the United
States Constitution compels the result in Castro and, indeed, there
is considerable authority to the contrary. 3 Thus, the Castro court
completely altered section 28(f) by grafting limitations onto the
provision created out of whole-cloth. As the Supteme Court of
California recently stated, "[o]ur Castro decision... rejected the
overwhelming weight of appellate authority and consciously
declined to accept the apparent plain meaning of the constitutional
language [of Proposition 8]." But despite this suggestion of a
willingness to reconsider its Castro decision, the supreme court has
not yet done so.
Admittedly, the changes in the rules regarding the use of prior
felony convictions, even as limited by Castro, have been somewhat
significant. Prior to the enactment of Proposition 8, the Supreme
Court of California had interpreted California statutory law
allowing impeachment by use of prior felony convictions into
virtual extinction.65 The court allowed such impeachment only if
the prior felony was not for the same or similar type of offense for
which the accused stood charge,6 and if the prior offense
necessarily involved dishonesty as part of its legal definition. 67
Today, these limitations are merely two of several factors, rather
than dispositive tests, which trial judges often take into
consideration in exercising their discretion as to felony
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 313-17, 696 P.2d at 117-21, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725-29.
63. See Goldberg, supra note 46, at 628-33, and authorities cited therein; Imwinkelried and
Mdndez, Resurrecting California's Old Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAc. LJ. 1005, 1017-
19 (1992).
64. People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668,703,789 P.2d 887,906,268 Cal. Rptr. 706,725 (1990).
65. For a more detailed discussion of pre-Proposition 8 law regarding felony impeachment,
see Goldberg, supra note 46, at 622-24.
66. People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 230, 594 P.2d 19, 25, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (1979).
67. People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 114, 599 P.2d 74, 77, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886
(1979).
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impeachment.68 In practice, however, trial judges rarely allow
impeachment by use of felonies which involve the same or similar
type of conduct for which the defendant is charged.69 Under
current practice, despite the intent of California voters to liberally
use felony convictions for impeachment, such impeachment--even
under Proposition 8--is more restrictive than in most other
jurisdictions.7"
IV. REPEAL OF THE EVIDENCE CODE
Section 28(d) of article I of the California Constitution, enacted
by Proposition 8, commonly known as the "Right to Truth-in-
Evidence," or "Truth-in-Evidence" provision, was perhaps the
most ambitious provision contained in the initiative.7 ' The failure
of the criminal justice establishment to promptly implement the
Right to Truthoin-Evidence is also Proposition 8's greatest
disappointment. Section 28(d) provides as follows:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of
the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding..., or hearing of a juvenile
for a criminal offense .... Nothing in this section shall affect any
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code Section 352, 782, or 1103. Nothing in this section shall
affect any existing statutory or constitutional right ofqthe press.
72
68. See People v. Stewart, 171 Cal. App. 3d 59, 63-64, 215 Cal. Rptr. 716, 719-20 (1985)
(explaining factors to be considered in exercise of trial court's discretion involving felony
impeachment).
69. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 216 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1985), rehearing
granted, (Sept. 3, 1985) (opinion on rehearing not for publication) (Oct. 25, 1985). In Ortiz, the
appellate court found that the trial court erred in exercising its discretion allowing impeachment with
a prior conviction identical to that for which defendant was charged. Id. at 1030, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
850. This fear of error often motivates judges not to allow impeachment with identical offenses in
daily practice.
70. See Goldberg, supra note 46, at 630-33, and authorities cited therein (discussing laws of
sister jurisdictions and federal courts which liberally allow impeachment with prior convictions).
71. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 28(d).
72. Id.
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This provision was intended both to federalize the exclusionary
rule, and to expand the admissibility of relevant evidence in
criminal cases.
A. Federalization of the Exclusionary Rule
The plain language of the Truth-in-Evidence provision suggests
its implications for repealing evidentiary provisions restricting the
admissibility of relevant evidence. However, a less obvious and
less significant implication of the provision was to federalize the
exclusionary rule, a rule which generally makes unconstitutionally
obtained evidence inadmissible at trial." The Legislative Analyst
explained the impact of the initiative on the federal exclusionary
rule in the Proposition 8 ballot pamphlet as follows:
Under current law, certain evidence is not permitted to be presented in
a criminal trial. For example, evidence obtained through unlawful
eavesdropping or wiretapping, or through unlawful searches of persons
or property, cannot be used in court. This measure generally would
allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases subject
to such exceptions as the Legislature may in the future enact by a two-
thirds vote. The measure could not affect federal restrictions on the use
of evidence.74
California voters intended this provision to abrogate judicial
decisions which had required the exclusion of relevant evidence
solely to deter police misconduct in violation of a suspect's
constitutional rights under the state constitution.75 The People
apparently decided that the exclusion of evidence was not an
acceptable means of implementing those rights, except as required
by the United States Constitution.76
73. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
74. Legislative Analyst of CaliforniaAnalysis, in CALIFORNIA VoTERs PAMPL esupra note
21, at 32.
75. See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 318, 748 P.2d 307, 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 374
(1988) (implementing provisions of Proposition 8 which federalize the exclusionary rule).
76. Id
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Thus, to the extent that evidence was obtained in violation of
the California Constitution, but not in violation of the United States
Constitution, such evidence would still be admissible. This change
was of limited significance since the state and federal constitutions
contain the same provisions regarding criminal procedure.77
Since the passage of Proposition 8, California courts have
resisted abandoning outmoded rules of criminal procedure which
were faithfully applied prior to the initiative. It is still common for
practitioners and trial judges to erroneously apply invalid pre-
Proposition 8 law. 7' The checkered history of Proposition 8's
application to the exclusionary rule is understandable considering
the outright opposition of many in the criminal justice
establishment to the measure.79  This antipathy was expressed
eloquently by none other than Supreme Court of California Justice
Mosk, who stated:
77. Compare CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures); with
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures). Compare also CAL. CONsT.
art. I, § 15 (right to remain silent and right to counsel)'; with U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI (right to
remain silent and right to counsel, respectively). For a list of major changes in the exclusionary rule
brought about by Proposition 8, see Allen, Defense Motions After Lance W., 13 W. ST. U.L. REv.
35 (1985), and Jenkins and Thomas, supra note 46, at 28-29.
78. Occasionally such misstatements of law show up in appellate court cases. Most recently,
in People v. Renteria, 2 Cal. App. 4th 440, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 925 (1992), the appellate court made a
glaring mistake, quoting pre-Proposition 8 case law, which defined the legal standard justifying an
investigatory detention of a person as follows:
"fl]n order to justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or
apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect
that 1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur,
and 2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity. Not only must
be subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it must be objectively reasonable for him
to do so."
Id. at 443, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 927 (quoting In re James D., 43 Cal. 3d 903, 914, 741 P.2d 161, 172,
239 Cal. Rptr. 663, 674 (1987)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This is a correct statement of
pre-Proposition 8 California law. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 893, 582 P.2d 957, 959, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 366,368 (1978). However, under post-Proposition 8 law-federal law-whether an officer validly
stopped a person turns on "an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time, and not the officer's actual state of mind at the time the
challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985).
79. The Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice strongly opposed the initiative. CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JusTIcE, supra note 47, at 68-72 (citing alleged "constitutional
defects," "contradictions and sloppy draftings," "litigation explosion and other unintended
consequences," and "fiscal priorities" as reasons for opposition). See infra note 80 and
accompanying text (opining Proposition 8 to be an "ill-conceived measure").
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I must observe... that in Asia, Latin America, and other areas of this
troubled world courageous men and women are striving, and some are
dying, to establish and expand individual rights. It is ironic that in
California our existing individual rights are being curtailed.... We
cannot blame the United States Constitution or the United States
Supreme Court for this situation.... Rather, the blame for the sorry
situation in which we find ourselves must be placed squarely on
Proposition 8. That ill-conceived measure has struck down California
precedents on individual rights as it has encountered them in its path of
destruction.
8
Given the resentment toward Proposition 8, it is not surprising
that in the three areas of criminal procedure which most commonly
arise in daily practice--search and seizure, police interrogations, and
right to counsel issues--the Supreme Court of California has been
slow to implement Proposition 8. Considering the rather poor
performance in implementing other key provisions of Proposition
8, the Supreme Court of California was comparatively quick in
ruling that the rules regarding the admissibility of evidence
resulting from a search or seizure were to be governed by federal,
not California, law.81 This ruling, in 1985, took only two and one-
half years after Proposition 8's passage. 2 One commentator noted
that "two and one half years to decide so urgent a question was
simply too long .... No one has yet come forth with a credible
reason why the main substantive issues raised by the initiative
could not have been reached before 1985. ' '83
In 1987, the Supreme Court of California stopped Proposition
8 dead in its tracks, following the approach some lower courts
took, by ruling in an opinion authored by Justice Mosk, that the
initiative had no application to the admissibility of evidence
resulting from police interrogations which violated defendant's
80. People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63,72-73,775 P.2d 1042, 1048,260 Cal. Rptr. 273,279-
80 (1989) (Mosk, J., concurring).
81. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rpir. 631 (1985).
82. I
83. Bedsworth, In re Lance W.: The Ship of State Makes a Course Correction, 13 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 9, 11 (1985).
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Miranda84 rights.8" In other words, issues involving Miranda
violations would continue to be governed by California law,
notwithstanding the voters' clear intent to federalize the
exclusionary rule. Not until 1988 did the court finally reverse itself,
and fully implement Proposition 8 to govern the admissibility of
evidence taken in violation of Miranda.
8 6
Even now, however, there are major unresolved areas involving
the federalization of the exclusionary rule on which the Supreme
Court of California has yet to rule. Most significantly, although
there are slight differences between the California and federal
rights to counsel,87 it has not been conclusively determined
whether evidence alleged to have been gathered in violation of
defendant's right to counsel is governed by federal or California
law.88
B. Repeal of the Rules of Evidence
The public, "perceiv[ing an] imbalance in favor of defendants
in the rules regarding the admissibility of evidence," enacted the
Truth-in-Evidence provision.9 The Truth-in-Evidence provision
was intended to "restore balance to the rules governing the use of
evidence against criminals."" By its plain terms, the provision
expresses the electorate's intent that "both judicially created and
statutory rules restraining admission of relevant evidence in
criminal cases be repealed except insofar as 28(d) expressly
preserves them."'" The average lay person reading the Truth-in-
Evidence provision would immediately appreciate that, except to
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85. People v. May, 43 Cal. 3d 436, 729 P.2d 778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1987), vacated by 44
Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988).
86. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369.
87. See People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986).
88. See People v. Ledesma, 204 Cal. App. 3d 682, 689-96,251 Cal. Rptr. 417,419-24 (1988)
(holding that right to counsel questions are governed by Proposition 8).
89. People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738 (1986).
90. Curb, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in CAtFORNm BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra
note 21, at 34.
91. People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1082, 767 P.2d 619, 641, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 374
(1989).
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the extent expressly preserved, the rules of evidence are repealed
by the initiative. The reluctance of the courts to apply the Truth-in-
Evidence provision to the area of the exclusionary rule was
disappointing. However, the courts' unwillingness to apply the
provision to the question of the repeal of the rules of evidence was
astonishing. Despite the passage of a decade since the Truth-in-
Evidence provision was added to the constitution, California courts
have failed to determine whether key evidentiary rules are still in
effect.
In 1982 the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice compiled
an extensive laundry list of important evidentiary rules which
Proposition 8 would repeal, including rules limiting the use of
character evidence against the defendant, rules governing
impeachment evidence, and rules governing the admissibility of
scientific evidence.92 Ten years after the enactment of Proposition
8, the effect of the measure on most of these evidentiary rules has
not even been addressed, let alone resolved.
The continuing validity of Evidence Code section 110193--
which excludes propensity evidence--has not been determined.
Section 1101 severely limits the admissibility of character evidence
involving a defendant's prior criminal acts to prove his guilt in a
current case. 94 In 1984, the Supreme Court of California declined
to decide the issue of the validity of section 1101 in People v.
92. CALiFoRNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JusTicE, supra note 48, at 12, 19-21.
93. CAL EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1992). Section 1101 provides:
a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a
person's character or trait of his or her character (whether in the form on an opinion,
evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.
b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a
crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident,
or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful
sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other
than his or her disposition to commit such an act.
c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or attack
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Tassel195 stating, "the effect, if any, of Proposition 8 on the
questions of admissibility of evidence of other offenses is not
considered here since the offenses in this case predate June
1982. ,96 After the decision in Tassell, three appellate courts,
applying various rationales, concluded that Evidence Code section
1101 survived the enactment of Proposition 8. Since these
95. 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984).
96. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d at 82 n.1, 679 P.2d at 3 n.1, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 569 n.1.
97. See People v. Scott, 194 Cal. App. 3d 550, 239 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1987); Newman v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 377, 224 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1986); People v. Perkins, 159 Cal. App.
3d 646,205 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1984). In People v. Perkins, the Second District Court of Appeal strained
to find that evidence code section 1101 remained in effect. The court concluded as follows: "The
text of the 'Truth-in-Evidence' provision expressly preserves only three sections of the Evidence
Code, sections 325 [sic] [352], 782, and 1103. The retention of section 1103 also means the retention
of section 1101.... The text of 1103 states that the section exists as an exception to I101....
Section 1103 cannot exist as an exception to a nonexistent rule." Id at 650, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
However, this analysis failed to note that section 1103 actually contains two subsections. See CAL.
EvwD. CODE § 1103(a), (b) (West Supp. 1992). Section 1103(a) allows evidence of the character of
the crime victim when offered by the defendant to prove conduct in conformity with such character.
Id. § 1103(a) (West Supp. 1992). Section 1103(b) provides that in certain sexual assault cases
character evidence regarding the victim's sexual conduct is not admissible to prove consent by the
victim. Id. § 1103(b) (West Supp. 1992). Section 1103(b) was not repealed because the voters must
have intended to preserve the so-called rape shield law, which safeguards rape victims from certain
types of cross-examination at trial and is codified in that section and section 782, which was also
expressly preserved. See id. § 782 (West 1966) (providing for certain procedural safeguards to be
followed when evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness is offered to attack the
credibility of the witness in sexual assault cases). The Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8
only repeals evidentiary provisions which restrict the admissibility of relevant evidence. See supra
notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Truth-in-Evidence provision). Since section
1103(a) does not restrict the admissibility of evidence but ratherprovides for the admission of certain
types of character evidence, the Truth-in-Evidence provision would not affect it. Therefore, there was
no need to expressly include section 1103(a) as one of the provisions which the Truth-in-Evidence
provision preserved. That section 1103(a) was expressly preserved is meaningless surplusage, which
should not be read as an attempt to preserve section 1101. Despite its shortcomings, the line of
reasoning developed in Perkins was affirmed in the First District Court of Appeal in Newman v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 382, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
In People v. Scott, yet another theory was advanced by the an appellate court for the retention
of Evidence Code section 1101. People v. Scott, 194 Cal. App. 3d 550, 239 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1987).
The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that the Truth-in-Evidence provision did not repeal
section 1101 but rejected the Perkins analysis. Id. at 553-54, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 589-91. The Scott
court reasoned that Truth-in-Evidence provision expressly provides that the legislature may reenact
evidence code provisions. Id. at 554, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 591. Since the legislature amended section
1101 after the enactment of Proposition 8, the court interpreted this amendment to constitute a
reenactment of that section. Id at 554-56, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 590-92. However, the legislature only
intended the amendment of section 1101 to overrule the Supreme Court of California's restrictive
interpretation of section 1101 in People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567
(1984), which narrowly construed section 1101 to limit the admissibility of character evidence. CAL.
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appellate court decisions which strained to maintain section 1101
were decided, the Supreme Court of California has stated three
times that the continuing validity of section 1101 is still an open
question, and has declined to resolve the issue.98 Also, one court
of appeal questioned the three appellate decisions which suggested
that section 1101 survived Proposition 8 and stated that the issue
of the section's validity is still unresolved.99 It is remarkable that
the continuing validity of this cornerstone of the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence is still in doubt. As Professors
Imwinkelried and M~ndez state in their article on this topic: "[lit
is virtually unthinkable that ten years after the passage of
Proposition 8 uncertainty still surrounds the standard governing the
admissibility of such crucial and frequently used evidence.""°
Before the passage of Proposition 8, except for felony
convictions, all evidence of specific instances of conduct, including
misdemeanor convictions, were inadmissible to attack or support a
witness' credibility.' O' However, the Supreme Court of California,
in People v. Harris,"° held that the Truth-in-Evidence provision
nullified the evidence code provisions which precluded attacking or
supporting a witness' credibility with specific instances of
conduct." 3 The court also stated that in passing Proposition 8, the
electorate intended that "both judicially created and statutory rules
Evm. Co)E § 1101 (West Supp. 1992) (historical and statutory notes to 1986 legislation).
98. People v. Sully, 53 Cal. 3d 1195, 1225-26,812 P.2d 163, 180-81,283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 161-
62 (1991); People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1151 n.16, 783 P.2d 698, 707 n.16, 265 Cal. Rptr. Ill,
120 n.16 (1989); People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1081, 767 P.2d 619, 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352,
373 (1989).
99. People v. Lankford, 210 Cal. App. 3d 227, 237-40, 258 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327-29 (1989).
100. Imwinkelried and Mdndez, supra note 63, at 1012.
101. CAL. EVID. CoDE § 787 (West 1966). Section 787 provides that "[s]ubject to Section 788,
evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character
is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness." Id Section 788 of the California
Evidence Code provides, in part, that "'[for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it
may be shown by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been
convicted of a felony .... " Id § 788 (West 1966).
102. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1989).
103. Id at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Thus, the court held that is was
permissible to bolster the credibility of a police informant witness with evidence of his prior instances
of reliability, evidence which prior to Proposition 8 would have been inadmissible. Id. at 1081-82,
767 P.2d at 640-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
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restraining admission of relevant evidence in criminal cases be
repealed except insofar as 28(d) expressly preserves them.''104
In another section of the Harris opinion, the court suggested
that now, under the Truth-in-Evidence provision, misdemeanor
convictions could be used for impeachment."0 5 At least this is
how commentators, 10 6  and courts107  interpreted the decision.
Interestingly, two appellate court decisions so interpreting Harris
have been depublished. °8 Although this fact does not necessarily
indicate the court's position on the issue, in the light of the failure
of the supreme court to hand down express pronouncements about
the Truth-in-Evidence provision, trial courts and practitioners
increasingly attempt to speculate about the court's intent through
the cases it chooses to depublish.
Harris and several appellate court cases have interpreted the
Truth-in-Evidence provision as repealing the prior restriction
against cross-examining a witness about specific instances of
misconduct, which did not result in a conviction, to discredit the
witness' credibility. 1"9 For example, the Supreme Court of
California recently ruled in People v. Mickle11° that, under the
Truth-in-Evidence provision, the defense should have been allowed
to cross-examine a prosecution witness about that witness having
104. Id at 1082, 767 P.2d at 641, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
105. Id at 1090-91, 767 P.2d at 646-48, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 379-81. In Harris, the court
addressed the propriety of the trial courCs disallowing the defense to impeach a prosecution witness
with the fact of his misdemeanor probation. Id at 1090, 767 P.2d at 646, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 379. The
court stated that, although impeachment with misdemeanors was improper under former law,
"because section 28(d) now makes all relevant evidence admissible in criminal proceedings except
as provided in that section, the evidence is not inadmissible unless it is excluded pursuant to
Evidence Code Section 352." Id at 1090-91 n.22, 767 P.2d at 647 n.22, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.22
(referring to CAL EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1966)). Nevertheless, the court held that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in excluding such impeachment under Evidence Code section 352.
Id at 1081, 767 P.2d at 640, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
106. See Goldberg, supra note 46, at 634-35; Imwinkelried and Mdndez, supra note 63, at
1016-17.
107. But see People v. Wheeler, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1406 (1991) (providing for misdemeanor
impeachment), review granted, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1991).
108. People v. Bloodsaw, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1610, 274 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1990), ordered not
published pursuant to CAL. R. Cr. 979; People v. Pinkins, 223 Cal. App. 3d 69a, 69c-d (1990),
ordered not published pursuant to CAL R. Cr. 979.
109. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 46, at 642-44, and authorities cited therein.
110. 53 Cal. 3d 140, 814 P.2d 290, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1991).
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threatened other witnesses to prevent them from testifying against
him in a previous legal proceeding."' The court held that such
conduct showed a "morally lax character from which the jury
could reasonably infer a readiness to lie."" 2 The Mickle case
would have been the perfect opportunity for the court to clearly
articulate a new test governing the admissibility of such evidence.
However, the supreme court did not do so. In fact, several key
issues were not addressed. For example, can misconduct which
only results in a juvenile conviction or which results in an acquittal
be used for impeachment? Can a witness who testifies invoke his
right to remain silent if questioned about uncharged criminal acts?
And most importantly, what types of misconduct can a witness be
cross-examined about? These issues have gone virtually
unanswered by courts and commentators.
1 3
In Harris, the same case which held that Proposition 8 repealed
evidentiary rules restraining the admissibility of relevant evidence,
the supreme court also suggested that the Kelly-Frye rule governing
the admissibility of scientific evidence was not repealed.1 1 4 The
Kelly-Frye rule precludes otherwise relevant scientific evidence
from being admitted unless it meets certain requirements for
reliability--particularly general acceptance in the scientific
community." In Harris, the defendant contended that the trial
judge improperly disallowed evidence of his polygraph
examination, arguing that Proposition 8 repealed the prior
evidentiary rule disallowing such evidence. 6 The court held that
the Truth-in-Evidence provision did not have any impact on
"accepted rules by which the reliability and thus the relevance of
scientific evidence is determined.""1 7 Therefore, the court
111. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d at 168, 814 P.2d at 318, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 539. For additional cases
with similar holdings, see Goldberg, supra note 46, at 641-43.
112. Id at 168, 814 P.2d at 318, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
113. Goldberg, supra note 46, at 643-50.
114. People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1094, 767 P.2d 619, 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 382
(1989).
115. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,30-32,549 P.2d 1240,1244-45,130 Cal. Rptr. 144,148-
49 (1976) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
116. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1094, 767 P.2d at 649, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
117. Id
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suggested that the Kelly-Frye rule survived, and precluded the
admission of defendant's proffered polygraph." 8 Professors
Imwinkelried and M6ndez, in their article, point out that the Harris
court's "mistake is patent: Reliability and relevance are different
concepts," and that Kelly-Frye often serves to exclude relevant
evidence." 9 Moreover, the rule has been abandoned in many
jurisdictions throughout the nation.12 Of course, the Supreme
Court of California did not indicate whether Kelly-Frye might have
been modified by the Truth-in-Evidence provision to a simple
relevancy test. In fact, since Harris, the Supreme Court of
California has specifically held that the continuing validity of the
Kelly-Frye rule under the Truth-in-Evidence provision has not yet
been decided.'
The failure to implement Proposition 8's repeal of the rules of
evidence cannot be blamed exclusively on the courts. Criminal
practitioners are also to blame. For example, for the first nine years
after the enactment of Proposition 8, no court or commentator
addressed the issue of whether the corpus delicti rule remained in
effect. Under this rule, a defendant's confession is inadmissible
unless there is slight evidence apart from the confession to
corroborate that the crime was, in fact, committed.'22 Recently,
a law student wrote a comment arguing that the Truth-in-Evidence
provision has abolished, or at least modified, the corpus delicti
rule."z Despite the fact that corpus delicti rule is frequently an
issue in trial courts, prosecutors have not argued in response to
defense objections that the corpus delicti rule has not been
118. Id at 1094-95,767 P.2d at 649-50,255 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. The whole Kelly-Frye issue
could have been avoided in Harris since after the enactment of Proposition 8, as the court noted, the
legislature passed an evidentiary rule prohibiting the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Id. at 1095
n.26, 767 P.2d at 650 n.26, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.26 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (West
1992)).
119. Imwinkelried and Mindez, supra note 63, at 1021.
120. Id at 11.
121. People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1152 n.16, 783 P.2d 698, 707 n.16, 265 Cal. Rptr. 11,
120 n.16 (1989) (stating that whether Proposition 8 affected the Kelly-Frye rule and other evidentiary
rules relating to the admissibility of scientific evidence is undecided).
122. B. WrIKIN & N. EPsTEIN, CALUORNiA CRIMiNAL LAW § 140 (2d ed. 1988).
123. Comment, Reevaluation of the California Corpus Delicti Rule: A Response to the
Invitation of Proposition 8, 78 CAUF. L. REv. 1571 (1990).
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satisfied: "Your honor, there is no corpus delicti rule, that rule is
no longer in existence." In fact, criminal practitioners are
constantly citing repealed evidentiary rules and trial judges are
applying them every day in courts throughout our state. Even after
the California courts made it clear that prosecutors could impeach
witnesses by cross-examining them about specific instances of
uncharged misconduct, prosecutors have not asked trial judges to
allow them to do so. Interestingly, in the small handful of appellate
cases interpreting Proposition 8's impact on the rules of evidence,
it was often the defense which argued that a particular evidentiary
provision had been repealed 24--a curious result considering that
Proposition 8 was intended to correct a perceived imbalance
favoring criminal defendants in the rules of evidence.1
25
Practitioners can claim that they were waiting for clear guidance
from the courts before advancing evidentiary arguments based on
Proposition 8. But, it may have been the courts which were waiting
for the practitioners to advance the arguments before they decided
them.
CONCLUSION
There is enough blame to be shared for the failed and delayed
implementation of Proposition 8. The legislature, in the area of
victim restitution, for example, failed to promptly enact legislation
to carry out the initiative.'2 6 The courts, in major areas--including
application of the initiative to the abolition of the diminished
capacity defense, the exclusionary rule, and the liberalization of
124. Eg., People v. Mickle, 54 Cal. 3d 140, 168, 814 P.2d 290, 318, 284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 539
(1991) (defense argued that rules precluding impeachment with uncharged misconduct had been
repealed by Proposition 8) (discussed supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text); Harris, 47 Cal.
3d at 1094-95,767 P.2d at 649-50,255 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83 (defense argued that Kelly-Frye had been
repealed by Proposition 8) (discussed supra note 114 and accompanying text); People v.
Bergschneider, 211 Cal. App. 3d 144,164-65,259 Cal. Rptr. 219, 230-31 (1989) (defense argued that
rules precluding impeachment with uncharged misconduct had been repealed by Proposition 8);
People v. Adams, 198 Cal. App. 3d 10, 14-16, 243 Cal. Rptr. 580, 582-83 (1988) (defense argued
that rules precluding impeachment with uncharged misconduct had been repealed by Proposition 8).
125. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Taylor and Curb's
argument in favor of Proposition 8, which was printed in the ballot pamphlet).
126. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text (discussing the right to victim restitution).
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felony impeachment and evidentiary rules--delayed and subverted
the voters' intent. 7 Prosecutors, perhaps, have been lax in
failing to urge arguments based on Proposition 8. The defense bar,
as the history of the initiative in the area of the diminished capacity
defense amply illustrates, circumvented the proposition's
mandate.12 8
This is an interesting time in our state's legal history, almost
ten years after Proposition 8's passage, for a major California law
review to be publishing a symposium on Proposition 8. Quite
recently, the California electorate again attempted a major change
in the criminal justice system by passing Proposition 115,
commonly known as the Crime Victim Justice Reform Act.
129
Already, voices can be heard that the initiative is being applied so
as to frustrate "the people's expressed purpose to create 'a system
in which justice is swift and fair."' 13 It will be interesting to see
whether ten years from now Proposition 115 will have fared better
at the hands of the criminal justice establishment than did
Proposition 8.
127. See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text (discussing the abolition of the diminished
capacity defense, the use of prior convictions for felony impeachment, and the repeal of the evidence
code).
128. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text (discussing the defense bar's use of the
"diminished actuality" defense after the enactment of Proposition 8).
129. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 24, 29, 30.
130. Whitman v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 1063, 1075, 820 P.2d 262, 274,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
160, 172 (1991) (Kennard, 3., dissenting).

